Article published in the Business Line OpEd. (Friday, 30 Sep., 2011)
Business Line : Opinion : Where Delhi Metro went off track
29 September, 2011
Business Line : Opinion : Where Delhi Metro went off track
We need to take a leaf out of the Japanese experience in achieving technological self-sufficiency.
Delhi Metro preferred to put its faith in foreign consultants, unlike Japan which encouraged its own rail companies.
Delhi Metro preferred to put its faith in foreign consultants, unlike Japan which encouraged its own rail companies.
29 September, 2011
It is now almost a decade since the Delhi Metro
commenced its operations in the National Capital Region. A project
substantially financed by Japanese soft-loans has grown with time to
become a ‘lifeline' for the people of Delhi. Yet, the entire network
continues to be heavily reliant on imported equipment and spares.
While
there cannot be too many doubts regarding the utility and efficiency of
Delhi Metro's services, or even the project execution standards laid by
it, the question is: Have we been effective in leveraging this project
to create a vibrant domestic manufacturing industry in urban railways?
Has it facilitated domestic Research and Development (R&D) and
innovations to suit the diverse working conditions across India?
From Delhi Metro Rail Corporation's (DMRC) own annual reports, progress
in this field has been peripheral, at best. Manufacturing is limited to
coach shells and bogies being built by Bombardier-India and Bharat
Earth Movers Limited (BEML).
Under the head
‘Technology Absorption', the 2009-10 report mentions fire retardant
low-smoke zero-halogen, low-voltage cables, fire pumps and 25kV rigid
overhead electrical systems and “other items which were imported in
Phase-I (and) have since been developed by Indian industries and
supplied in Phase-II”. But the core technologies — electrical traction
systems, rolling stock and signalling — remain firmly under the control
of foreign companies.
All this is reflected in the
huge forex outflows towards expenditure for contracts and consultancy
fees (Rs 1,316 crore in 2009-10). The strategic and financial
implications of this kind of dependency cannot be ignored.
LEARNING FROM JAPAN
In
this context, perhaps we might take a leaf out of the Japanese
experience in achieving technological self-sufficiency. Take Japan's
famous ‘Bullet Trains' (Shinkansen), which actually emerged from a World
Bank-aided programme in the 1960s. For that time, the Shinkansen
concept, which was not just new but also revolutionary, introduced
innovations that are standard features for all high-speed rail networks.
These
innovations came when Japan was still under a US-led occupation through
General Douglas MacArthur's Supreme Command of the Allied Powers
(SCAP). In the late 1950s, a team of visionary leaders emerged in Japan
National Railways (JNR). Foremost among them was Shinji Sogo, a former
director of the South Manchuria Railways (Mantetsu), which had, for more
than half a century, been funnelling out raw materials from China for
imperial Japan's war efforts.
Following Japan's
surrender in 1945, the SCAP imposed measures to ensure effective
de-militarisation of the country. The aeronautics industry, responsible
for creating legendary fighting machines like such as the ‘Zeros'
(Mitsubishi fighter planes), was dismantled. Rendered jobless, a large
number of aeronautical engineers and designers moved into the railway
sector. Next to the military, the railways now had the largest number of
engineers.
By the early 1950s, the main Tokaido
line, connecting Tokyo to Osaka, was getting congested. Although it
represented only three per cent of the railway system by length, it
carried 24 per cent of JNR's traffic and 23 per cent of its freight. The
highways, too, were congested, while the existing narrow gauge railway
was already operating at full capacity.
REASONS FOR SUCCESS
The
stage was then set for building the Shinkansen. Under Sogo's
leadership, JNR and the Railway Technical Research Institute (RTRI)
prepared a feasibility study. The government was persuaded to fund the
project through a WB loan. When ‘experts' from the Bank recorded their
reservations on the ambitious project, Sogo stood firmly by his own
engineers' side and reiterated his confidence in the technical
capabilities of RTRI.
The Bank ultimately agreed to
furnish a loan of $80 million, which was more than a quarter of the
project cost.When it was finally unveiled in 1964 — well in time for the
Tokyo Olympics — the new railway system symbolised the coming-of-age of
Japan's technical prowess and self-reliance. The project's success also
boosted the confidence of RTRI as an institution and it went on to be a
global leader in rail innovation & technology. Three technology
elements were critical to the success of the Shinkansen project, all of
which came from RTRI: Dedicated high-quality tracks, minimal curves
along the route, and the special rolling stock. The tracks were composed
of long-welded rails, each measuring approximately a mile in length,
and linked together by expansion joints, with double elastic fastenings
on pre-stressed concrete ties. The track curves were designed to be
gentle, permitting the maintenance of higher speeds.
Unlike
conventional railways, the Shinkansen did not have dedicated engines —
they relied on ‘distributed power' with motors and axles all along the
train, rather than having them concentrated at either end. This reduced
track wear and tear, improved braking and reliability.
RTRI-JNR
also conducted extensive research to create light-weight bogies. Bodies
were made of aluminium rather than steel; special welding techniques
were used to dispense with heavy fillers in the body shell; and the
axles strengthened by metallurgical elements to avoid the need for extra
weight. Several prototypes were designed and tested for coming up with
the best possible equipment for the local running conditions, which, of
course, included measures against earthquakes and high-speed winds. It
is worth noting that none of the R&D and testing involved any of the
leading Western railroad companies.
FOREIGN CONSULTANTS
In
India, the equivalent of Japan's RTRI is the Railway Design and
Standards Organisation (RDSO). However, as the title suggests, its
emphasis has been more on testing and approval of standards than in any
breakthrough innovations. RDSO's limited role in urban transport systems
is apparent from the fact that the chaotic construction of Kolkata
Metro in the 1970s yielded few lessons. More than two decades later,
Delhi Metro preferred to start on a clean slate, putting its faith in
foreign consultants rather than RDSO or building local institutional
capabilities.
Unlike India, Japan, from the very
outset, encouraged its own rail companies. The Shinkansen project
involved five of them — Nippon Sharyo, Hitachi, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Kiki Sharyo and Tokyu Car Corp. A healthy competition within
the private sector ensured that innovative ideas emerging from the
national labs were quickly adopted, leading to a continuous improvement
of Japan's railway infrastructure.
The absence of
close collaboration between public R&D and the private sector has
been India's Achilles Heel. Unless local manufacturers are encouraged to
participate and compete in the railway sector, our dependence on
foreign equipment suppliers, their expensive spares and consultancy
services will only grow.
