Lighting up a Blind Spot in the East

Most South Indian middle-class families have a Burma connection. One that goes back a gneration of two when the country was an attractive destination for young men seeking employment, and for traders trying to make their fortunes.

Perhaps the first time I heard about the country was at the home of a family friend in Hyderabad in the mid 1970s. This gentleman had a large, framed picture of the magnificent Shwedagon Pagoda in his drawing room, as well as intricately woven baskets made of bamboo, mementos from his frequent visits to Rangoon.

Then there were books that told you about the country's past - Amitav Ghosh's "The Glass Palace" and the Ibis Trilogy. Short stories by George Orwell, references to the World War in books by Japanese authors, Michio Takeyama and Haruki Murakami.

What about Burma after it became Mynamar? The whole country seems to have slipped into some kind of blind-spot with hardly any news coming in directly. Nothing much except for the occasional news-stories from Western magazines about of Aung Sang Suu Kyi,  and the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis. It was a big blind spot waiting to be filled and I was pleased to get hold of a book by Burmese born author and diplomat, Thant Myint-U.

Myint-U's book "Where China Meets India" is bit like walking across the street to visit a reticent neighbour, and realising that you own house looks so different from the other side! You are reminded that parts of your own house belonged to them not so long ago, and vice versa. The Burmans once ruled over the Assam valley, and kings of tiny Manipur once invaded and subjugated the rulers of Mandalay.

China too looks like a completely different country when viewed through the eyes of a neighbour.  I learnt, for instance, that Yunnan, the Chinese province bordering Myanmar is as ethnically diverse, with a per-capital GDP which is among the lowest in China. Over the past few decades, China's Western Development Strategy seeks to remedy this disparity by connecting its poorest, land-locked provinces to the sea, through Myanmar.

Getting all the local tribes and communities - most of them mutually hostile - was certainly not easy. The process of assimilating non-Han Chinese has been a work-in-progress for the past 1000 years or more. The Yao were brought to heel in the 1450s in a war in which the Chinese killed 7300 and took as many, or more, PoWs; The Miao lost out in the Battle of Mount Leigong in 1726 where more than 10,000 Miao had their heads chopped off  and 400,000 starved to death; Ditto for the Buyu in 1797. And then there are groups like the Naxi who owe their musical skills to a band left behind by the Mongol invader, Kublai Khan. Another community which has managed to keep its traditions is the Musuo people living north of Lijiang. Among the matrilineal Musuo,  women are strong and dominant, engaging in 'walking marriages', very similar to the "Sambandham" system practiced by Nairs of Kerala.

A lot of water has flowed down the Irrawaddy since then. Burma is now Myanmar, its capital has moved from Mandalay and Rangoon to a newly purpose-built capital city of Naypyidaw. After years of international sanctions trade is on the upswing, and the country is trying to lower its dependence on China.

Perhaps the day is not far off when we too can drive across from Guwahati to Mandalay, or just take a ferry from Kolkata to Yangon/Rangoon.

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LINKS & REFERENCES

* Myint-U, Thant (2011): WHERE CHINA MEETS INDIA - Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Faber and Faber, 2012 URL - https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/12151572-where-china-meets-india

* Literature - Japanese connection - https://www.mmtimes.com/news/literary-sun-rising-over-golden-land.html

* Wiki - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar










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* Myint-U, Thant (2011): WHERE CHINA MEETS INDIA - Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Faber and Faber, 2012

-----link-----
https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/12151572-where-china-meets-india

To OBOR or not to OBOR

A grand summit is now on in China. Around 65 countries are participating in the One Belt One Road (ORBOR) meeting which envisages construction of international trunk passageways and an infrastructure network connecting all sub-regions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa.

There is big money promised for these projects - China has committed a total of about $100 billion to three new infrastructure funds: a $ 40 billion fund to the Central Asia-focused Silk Road Fund, a $ 50 billion fund to a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and a $ 10 billion fund to the BRICS-led New Development Bank.

India, however, has opted out. It is anything but enthusiastic about the CPEC, a highway that cuts through territory that has been illegally occupied by Pakistan.

What does this mean to countries that are enthusiastically participating in OBOR? Perhaps they expect a windfall by way of investments and market access. Or perhaps they will take a closer look at countries that have already borrowed tons of money from China, and ten contemplate - like Sri Lanka - whether they did the right thing.

Sri Lanka is currently in $58.3 billion debt to foreign financiers, and 95.4% of all government revenue is currently going towards paying back its loans. Of this, about $8 billion is owed to China alone, of which $1.4 billion was borrowed by the Sri Lankan government for constructing the Hambantota port.

Since these investments are not bringing in revenue as projected during the - rather hasty and secretive - planning & approval, the state is handing over its assets to Chinese companies on long-term lease:

• 80% of its Hambantota port has been handed over for 99 years, to China Merchants Holdings.
• Colombo’s South Container Terminal is a 35-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement with the same company
• IZP, a Chinese informational technology company, has been put forward as a potential purchaser of Mattala International Airport.

So is there a pattern here? Borrow on easy terms, belatedly discover that the revenue model was flawed, and grudgingly hand over your land and assets to the foreign lender?



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LINKS & REFERENCES


* (2017) ET - http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/obor-summit-in-china-know-what-it-is-and-why-india-is-not-attending/articleshow/58656653.cms

* (2017) IE - http://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/china-one-belt-one-road-project-obor-4653564/

* (2017) IE - Belt Road Initiative - http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-belt-and-road-initiative-in-giant-trade-belt-road-to-new-growth-rush-4651727/

* (2017) FT - One belt, one road and many questions -- https://www.ft.com/content/d5c54b8e-37d3-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec

* (2017) - Bloomberg - https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-17/can-china-afford-its-belt-and-road

* (2017) Wanda Bullish on India - http://m.indiatoday.in/story/china-one-belt-one-road-meet-india-boycott-wang-jianlin/1/955695.html

* (2017) Express edit - https://www.google.co.in/amp/indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/after-the-no-show-india-china-one-belt-one-road/lite/

* (2017) The Guardian - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road

* (2017) Dawn, Pakistan - CEPC for Pakistan - A Colonial Enterprise?  - https://www.dawn.com/news/1333244

* (2016) Wire -- https://thewire.in/40388/one-belt-one-road-shaping-connectivities-and-politics-in-the-21st-century/


Hanbantotta - China's own port in Sri Lanka

* (2017) Forbes - India Tells Sri Lanka: You Can Take Your Port And Shove It - https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/01/21/india-tells-sri-lanka-take-your-trincomalee-deep-sea-port-and-shove-it/#14a10f915f88

* (2016) Forbes -- https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/07/31/china-to-sri-lanka-we-want-our-money-not-your-empty-airport/#27d0ecb21beb

A Bridge That Went Too Far

A debate is raging over one of India's first "successful" Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects.

The Delhi-Noida-Direct (DND), an arterial, privately-built road connecting NOIDA to Delhi has been declared toll-free by the courts, and the company in question, ILFS-NTBCL, is trying it best to return to status quo.

By all accounts, the status quo seems like a perfect sweetheart deal where the private company keeps on making handsome returns in perpetuity, at the cost of the public.

The DND story begins in the early 1990s when the country had just initiated major economic reforms and its public infrastructure was in a woeful state. A company formed by retired government bureaucrats, IL&FS, won a contract for building the road-bridge in 1997. The construction was completed ahead of schedule, and the bridge was opened in 2001. Under the contract, the company was to get an assured return of 20% return on investment, over a 30 year period.

What exactly was the investment involved? Now this is where things start getting murky. IL&FS reported that engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) cost was Rs 193 crore. The cost for acquiring the land, facilitated by the Noida administration, was just Rs 11 crore. On to this amount, the company added an a huge  "management fee" of about Rs 200 crores, bringing the total cost to Rs 378 crores.

As if this was not enough, the Total Project Cost (TPC) was calculated ex-post and remained open-ended to include just about anything (with zero-risk to IL&FS). This ensured that the TPC and the toll-rates could be revised upwards with each passing year. It also ensured that the "20% assured return" would always remain unmet, and the total cost spiraled to Rs.5,000 crore in 15 years!

In 2001, the government was wet behind the ears about PPPs. Soon after the DND project was completed it realized that the private developers were leading it by the nose, and came up with a series of measures to ensure fair-play and public accountability in PPP contracts. By 2005, Model Concession Agreement (MCA) were ready for PPP projects, along with samples of other documents like Request for Qualification (RfQ) and Request for Proposal (RfP).

So what happens to the contract that was signed between IL&FS and the government (UP & Delhi)? The company, quite naturally, continues to claim that it has the legal right to do as it pleases.

Fortunately this issue has come to a head with the filing of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The Allahabad High Court noted that NTBCL had “recovered all reasonable returns” on its investment, and was no longer entitled to collect toll. The company filed an appeal to the Supreme Court which tossed it aside with a note of sarcasm - "You have only ten kms of highway", the bench said, "and you claim that you have made a road to the moon"!

A follow-up study is now analyzing the company records for the profits it has made so far. It would be interesting to know exactly how the ex-bureaucrats went laughing all the way to the bank.

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* Puri, Pradeep (2016) Article by the ex-IAS officer who joined IL&FS -
"Making the DND Flyway Toll Free can Ring Death Knell for Private Investment in India"  http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/making-dnd-flyway-toll-free-can-ring-death-knell-for-private-investment-in-indias-infrastructure/

* Rejoinder - Mohanty, Nalini (23Nov16) - "Why the DND is a Virtual Sellout at Public Expense" - https://www.newslaundry.com/2016/11/22/why-the-dnd-is-a-virtual-sellout-to-private-companies-at-public-expense

* Mint (2Nov2016) - http://www.livemint.com/Politics/sh9pNZbfTPnt7r0ZPjxjtI/Price-of-making-DND-Flyway-free-to-use-amounts-to-Rs5000-cr.html


* DNA (28Oct2016) - http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-dnd-flyway-row-you-ve-not-built-a-road-to-moon-sc-tells-noida-toll-firm-2268316
* Indian Express (28Oct2016) - http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/issues-and-arguments-how-a-key-delhi-noida-bridge-went-toll-free-3730051/

* Singh, Abhinav Prakash (10Apr2013) -- Delhi-Noida Toll Bridge- Loot in the name of Public-Private Partnerships (An excellent primer!) -- http://centreright.in/2013/04/delhi-noida-toll-bridge-loot-in-the-name-of-public-private-partnerships/#.WDVCctV97IU

* Chandran, Rahul (2007, Mint) - http://www.livemint.com/Companies/GaP1xmYycrKNl8KPvvcFEK/With-DND-he-paved-the-way-for-smooth-publicpvt-partnership.html

* Qunit (16Oct16) -- https://www.thequint.com/videos/2016/10/27/bigger-loss-toll-free-dnd-means-commuters-face-ticket-less-mess-noida-allahabad-high-court
- the court noted that “the Concessionaire, according to their own financial statements, has recovered Rs 810.18 crore (approx) from toll income from the date of commencement of the project till 31.03.2014 and after deduction of operation and maintenance expenses and corporate income tax, the surplus was Rs 578.80 crore.”

Jaipur Metro

If ever you feel like having a better appreciation for what has been achieved by Delhi Metro, please take a ride - if possible during rush hours - on Jaipur Metro.

Built at at a cost of Rs. 2023 Crores in about four years, it touted as a futuristic project that was implemented in record time. Perhaps it is also the first metro project in India that has been implemented entirely using a state government's own resources. JMRC has much to be proud of.

How does this infra feel at the ground level?

I had a chance to to ride to ride the Jaipur metro a few days ago (Ramnagar to Sindhi Camp), and my first impression is that, as of now, it seems like a white elephant. A lonely white elephant with very long legs. 

Even six months after starting the services, the metro stations were practically empty during the rush hour. Since it was not considered worthwhile to waste energy on the escalators for so few people, passengers had to climb almost 150 steps to reach the platform level!

The platforms, however,  are better designed than the ones you see on Delh Metro. Guidelines marking the entry points are not painted on the platform floor as an afterthought but built into the stone tilework, so they are never going to get worn off. Unlike in Delhi where most elevated lines run at the rooftop level, the height of JMRC pillars ensure that you get a fantastic panoramic view of Jaipur city, with its old forts on the surounding hilltops.

There are a few puzzling features too. The overhead pantographs on the trains seem a lot thinner and less rugged than in Delhi. Does it make a difference to the travel experience? I doubt it. However, the steep gradient of descent from the elevated to underground lines ensures that the sound of brakes and grating metal stays with you long after you leave the train.

This is a work in progress. So one hopes that the JMRC will expand it network and persuade more and more people to use its services. Getting the escalators to work may be a good way to start.

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LINKS

* Official website of JMRC (very useful!) - https://www.jaipurmetrorail.in/

* (3Jun15 - IE) - All you wanted to know about Jaipur Metro in 18 points - http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/jaipur-metro-rail-all-you-wanted-to-know-in-18-points/79835/

* https://www.jaipurmetrorail.in/pdf/39Brief%20Note%20on%20the%20Project.pdf

Sanctioned, Allocated & Released!

During the ongoing Budget Session of the Indian Parliament, numbers linked to three words are a source of much angst and analysis -- sanctioned, allocated and released.

Most often, 'sanction' refers to the amount of money notionally set aside by the Planning Commission of India towards implementation of its "Five Year Plans". Once a sanction has been made, the Ministry of Finance uses it as a reference number while 'allocating' budget for each activity listed its annual plans.

Now, allocation is linked to the extent of utilization. So the amount that is finally released for work on the ground may be a fraction of what was originally sanctioned by the planners.

Take for instance a flagship scheme which goes by the unweildy acronym - JNNURM. This is the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), created to 'encourage reforms and fast track planned development of identified cities'. In all, 73 cities were identified across India, and the Planning Commission 'sanctioned' Rs. 66,085 Crores (~$13 billion) for a period of seven years (2005-11).

Since 2005, the actual money allocated through the annual budgets passed by the parliament has been 73 percent -- Rs.47,967 Crores ( ~$ 9.5 billion). Allocations have fallen short of targets mainly because many states could not put in place, a set of four "mandatory reforms' -- (1) Implementation of decentralization measures as envisaged in the 74th Constitution Amendment, (2) Reform of the Rent Control Act and rationalization of stamp duty, (3) Repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and (4) Enactment of public disclosure law and community participation law.

All states have initiated these reforms but none have implemented them fully. Oddly enough, Tamil Nadu, which has the lowest rate of reform-implementation at 25% has the highest number of completed projects at 68%!

According to a CAG report submitted last year (28 Nov., 2012), only 17 percent of sanctioned projects under urban infra, have been implemented (231 of 1298). The record is even worse for housing projects: 22 of 1517 projects -- just one percent!

So, in the final reckoning, only Rs. 32,934 (less than 50%) of the original money sanctioned has been 'released' for completed projects between 2005-2011.

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LINKS / REFERENCES:

* Ministry of Urban Development - Home Page - http://jnnurm.nic.in/state.html

* JNNURM Overview -- http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/PMSpeechOverviewE.pdf
- selected cities (7+28+28) - page 14

* PRS Blog -- Status of JNNURM (7 Dec., 2012) - http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/?p=2330

Formula-1 in the Fields of Dankaur

View Larger Map

The race is over. Vettel won.

Mayavati, representing the 'head of state', has handed over the gleaming trophies while the ministers of the central government have been acting like petulant children, claiming that they were not invited and threatening tax raids at the same time. Given their handling of the Commonwealth Games, its a small mercy that they were not directly involved!

The English newspapers and TV channels have been going on and on about the success of India' first Formula 1 Series. There are breathless descriptions of the assorted celebrities studding the stands; of the roar of engines and incredible speeds.

However, but I have been looking for the more mundane details :

• First of all, who conceived the plan for transforming a sleepy Delhi suburb into a world-class F1 circuit facility?
• Why is it that Mayavati's Uttar Pradesh succeeded while the big boys of Mumbai and Bangalore threw in the towel and fell by the wayside?
• How did the Jaypee Group engage the best international expertise to design and implement a project of this scale?

Some information that has emerged -

Project cost: Jaypee spent $200m for the construction and paid another $200 as license fees to F1
Key Player: Vickey Chandok, President, Federation of Motor Sports Clubs of India (FMSCI)

I am yet to come across a story that ties all these loose threads. The search continues...

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REFERENCES & LINKS

Will F1 put economy on fast track? - V. SUMANTRAN (Business Line, 2 Nov., 2011)

Formula 1: India GP to 'Break-Even in Four Years (ET, 1 Nov., 2011) -

Wikimap of Dankaur, Noida

Two Highways in Kerala

For anybody traveling out of Thiruvananathapuram by road, there are essentially two choices - the national highway (NH-47) or the Main Central (MC) Road. Both run through the length of Kerala with the NH mostly hugging the coastline and lagoons, while the MC is a roller-coaster snaking through the central hills and valleys.

Yesterday we had to make a round trip to Chertala (literally "Swamp Head"), around 180km from Tvm. For the onward journey we drove down the NH and returned in the evening using the MC. It was a journey that provided a glimpse into the patchwork of intentions that marks infra development in Kerala.

The National Highways are built and owned by the central government, with its management being outsourced to the state. In Kerala it follows the minimum national standards so we have a two-lane configuration all through. The poor quality of construction and maintenance is apparent in many places - potholes, loose gravel and traffic jams. The MC road, on the other hand, is now a strange animal - something of a cross between an autobahn and a bullock-cart track.

The stretch from Changanaserry to Pantalam is the bullock-cart patch, with the traffic crawling at snailpace through narrow, broken roads and single-lane bridges. Then, suddenly, as you approach Pandalam, you have stretches that are so perfect that it is difficult to believe that you are on the same highway! The two-lane highway now comes with clearly demarcated shoulders, lanes and crossings. The stretch is so good that you now have the time to take in the lush green hills and paddies dotting the countryside.

Strangely, there is no sign of any further effort to make the MC Road consistently better.  The complete absence of road construction equipment along the way makes you wonder what brought about this patchwork quilt where excellence and mediocrity sit side by side.


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LINKS:

World Bank Project & Operations (2009): India: Kerala State Transport Project; URL - http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Type=Overview&theSitePK=40941&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&piPK=64290415&Projectid=P072539

Status Report: India - Kerala State Transport Project : P072539 - Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 21; URL - http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=0000A8056_2011012510353917

Kumar, Sanjeev V (2006): Kerala State transport project second phase to be launched next month, The Hindu BusinessLine 20 Jan 2006; URL - http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2006/01/20/stories/2006012002272100.htm

AASTHO & Institution Building

MoSRTH is making a serious effort to improve highways in India. Having had some success with the GQ, it now aims at introducing expressways linking important cities. As of now there are hardly any in the country. One links Ahmedabad - Baroda and another is the Mumbai-Pune Expressway. There is one coming up between Delhi and Gurgaon but this one is just a disconnected set of seven flyovers; it lacks the most basic characteristic of an expressway: access control.

But hey, we're on the learning curve and one agency that the experts look up to is AASTHO. An odd sounding acronym for Indian ears but it stands for the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO). It is a nonprofit, nonpartisan association whose primary goal is to foster development, operation, and maintenance of an integrated national transportation system.

Experts talk about AASTHO with a degree of reverence and awe; of how they have institutionalized continuous learning; of how they incorporate the latest developments in technology and accidents-data to create

Today I came across a sampler - – “Guide for Development of Rest Areas”.

Everything is measured and studied – safety, cost-benefit, motorist safety. First a Systems Analysis is used to determine existing and future needs of the overall system. This includes – traffic volume, annual usage survey data, spacing intervals.

Interesting tidbits:

• On rural inter-state highways, absence of rest areas results in 52% increase in shoulder-related accidents
• Reduction in drive fatigue accident rates due to the rest area is 3.7%
• Well designed, well maintained rest areas create a positive image for state motorists; enhance quality of life for residents; promote tourism;
• USC 111 prohibits commercial information at travel info centers or rest areas
• Spacing between stopping opportunities – 100km (60mi) or one hour
• Exterior lighting – affects physical safety, loitering / criminal activity, “inadquate lighting makes travelers feel unsafe when stopping. Characteristics of major options –
• Mercury vapour – blue-green light; fair color; poor cost efficiency
• Metal halide – white; good color; moderate efficienc
• High-pressure sodium – yellow; poor color; good efficiency
• Low-pressure sodium – yellow; very poor color; very cost efficient

When will IRC grow up to become an AASTHO?