How does one calculate a ride on the Delhi Metro? A recent article in the Indian Express was hinged on this question, and it came up with a politically charged conclusion from a minister in the Delhi Government who said it was "Extremely worrying" to see a 17% drop ridership in the months of March, April and May, as compared to 2017. So, what exactly is ridership? Ridership here refers to "Daily Average Ridership (DAR)", a metric used by Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) across its six corridors — Yellow, Blue, Red, Green, Violet, and Magenta. An RTI filed by the newspaper came up with the following data on DAR for three months in 2017 and 2018 for five corridors (Yellow, Blue, Red, Green, and Violet):
March 2017 - 2.76 million; March 2018 - 2.2 million
April 2017 - 2.75 million; April 2018 - 2.26 million
May 2017 - 2.65 million; May 2018 - 2.25 million
This alleged drop in ridership is important because DMRC had brought in a sharp increase in fares in October 2017, a politically charged decision that was strongly opposed by AAP, the ruling party in Delhi Government, which is also a stakeholder in Delhi Metro. DMRC has been clamoring for a fare review for more than a decade in order to cut dependence on government subsidies, and to be at least operationally viable. On 29 May, 2018, a day after opening the entire Magenta Line (Botanical Garden to Janakpuri West), DMRC stopped using the DAR metric and started a new one called "Line Utilization Data (LUD)". Unlike DAR which was calculated based on the entry and exit made by a passenger at the automatic fare collection (AFC) gates, LUD logs only overall utilization data. Double-counting is avoided and a passenger moving from one corridor to another is counted as a single trip only. For instance, a trip from Noida to Gurgaon across the blue-line and yellow-line would count as one trip, not two. It is unclear when exactly the LUD metric started getting used. If it started after the fare hike, this could easily explain the alleged drop in ridership in March-April-May 2018. Strangely, while the Financial Express says one thing, its sister concern, the IndianExpress reports the opposite. On 30 May 2018, FE reported "Delhi Metro had posted a steady rise in the average ridership, with nearly 27 lakh (2.7m) commuters taking the rapid transit network daily in February this year". Three weeks later, IE tells us that for the very same month - Feb., 2018 - ridership was 22.18 lakhs (2.2m)! As expected, AAP, the ruling party in Delhi, is highlighting the latter to prove that the fare hike is driving people away from the metro. Regular metro users like me find it extremely difficult to believe this. Far from seeing a drop in commuters I see crowded trains even during off-peak hours. In fact, within a month of opening the Magenta line, it has become impossible to find car parking at the nearest OBS Metro station! ----------------------------------------------------- LINKS & REFERENCES * (30May18), FE - https://www.financialexpress.com/infrastructure/railways/dmrc-uses-new-count-metric-on-traffic-flow-doesnt-share-ridership/1187488/ * (21Jun18) IE - Metro ridership plummets 5 lakh - https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/delhi-metros-daily-ridership-plummets-five-lakh-as-compared-to-last-year-5226272/
Is the Delhi Metro unprepared to cope with its own rapid expansion? How do passengers cope with sudden disruptions in the suburban network?
Things that you read in the papers, shake your head in disappointment, and then flip over to the next page. It takes a first hand experience to jolt you out of the detached, disinterested way in which most of us go through the daily grind. I got mine today.
At 15:30 today, I went down the ITO station to a business meeting at Dwaraka Sector-12 . On a normal day this journey takes about 40-60 minutes and I was quite sure that I would reach in time. About an hour later, at Uttam Nagar on the outskirts of Dwaraka, the train suddenly stopped. For the next one hour annoucements on the PA system mentioned a "technical snag", and then about "disruption in electrical supply" which would be "repaired soon". At 17:45 the train slowly crawled to the next station.
By this time it was clear that I would have to reschedule my meeting. So I went down for a chat with the metro staff before taking a return train to Noida. "Oh, this sort of thing keeps happening", said the man at the turnstiles, "There is no way to predict how long the repair work is going to take...40 minute, or four hour, your guess is as good as mine!"
A fee passengers who had stepped out to look for alternate transport came back dejected. As soon as news of the network failure got around, the taxi and auto drivers had promptly switched to "surrge pricing", a nifty term for fleecing helpless people.
Nearly an hour later, at 18:30 the train came to a stop at Rajiv Chowk. There was an unbelievable mass of humanity outside the windows, and as soon as the doors slid open, commuters exploded into the compartment, and then, the doors would not close because folks on the outside just did not want to let go. It took a lot of coaxing and cajoling from the guards to get the train rolling again. The same scene was repeated at the next major crossing - Yamuna Bank.
I got out of the Blue-Line at 19:30, full four hours after I entered into the network.
DMRC is clearly under severe strain. The Delhi network currently handles an average ridership of 2.7 million people a day, of which the Blue-Line (the longest with 44 stations) handles a million passengers - 64 percent of the load.
Is there a pattern to the network failures along the Blue-Line? Is there a better way of communicating such failures to the commuters? Is there a more cost effective way of evacuating passengers in emergency situations?
DMRC has an active PR department but it needs to go way beyond issuing the usual press-releases. Disruptions like these present opportunities to prepare the city for bigger emergencies.
It
has been a while since we saw our celebrities wielding the broom. What has
become of the “Swachh Bharat Abhyaan”
launched with much fanfare last year?
Despite
all the sporadic campaigns, many of us continues to cringe when we see children
toss empty chips packets out of school buses; car drivers deftly opening the
door of a moving car, to spit paan on the roads; shopkeepers tossing
their garbage right on to the streets, and people nonchalantly walking past
piles of litter on the streets. In our feudal mindscape it is still somebody
else’s job to clean up after we have had our fun.
Delhi
Metro has been struggling with the similar attitudes for more than a decade
now. It has been successful, to a certain extent, in persuading commuters to
stand in lines while waiting on platforms - especially at large intersections
like Rajiv Chowk and Mandi House. Inside the trains, while it has now become
rare to find men occupying seats reserved for ladies, and yet, a lot of people do
get away with littering, sitting on the floors (especially in-between coaches),
and consuming food & drinks on the trains.
I
had an experience last week that illustrates something that had escaped my
notice – the dynamics of behaviour change in our public spaces.
On
an “Odd-Even” day and I was returning home on the Violet Line of Delhi Metro.
At Khan Market, a young couple entered the compartment, their arms overflowing
with eatables - two cans of cola, and packets of chips and biscuits. The man
got a ladies seat vacated for his friend, and both continues chomping and
drinking as the train moved on.
Eating
and drinking is prohibited on Delhi Metro. Having seen numerous instances of
spilled drinks and discarded food on the trains, I ventured towards the man, apologised
for intruding, and quietly requested him to avoid eating on the crowded train
and to put away the drinks until he was out of the station.
"Sorry,
can't help it", he said loudly, "we are very hungry."
Duly
rebuffed, and not wanting to make a scene, I backed off. A few minutes later
there was a huge commotion. The fact that a polite request had no effect on the
couple seems to have rankled a lot of nerves. A number of passengers had now
taken on the couple, and their tone had swiftly moved from polite requests, to expressions
of derision, disdain, and anger.
Now
the shoe was on the other foot. Left with no choices, the drinks and food packets
were quietly tucked away, and tempers started to cool down.
As
I stood there marvelling at the way in which a tired, disinterested group of
commuters had suddenly rallied together to keep a coach clean, it suddenly
dawned on me that in a city were littering is so commonplace, we often overlook
the remarkable fact that that a vast majority of passengers on Delhi Metro do
follow the rules.
In
general, there is also an amazing level of toleration for those who break the
rules -- until a trigger makes people explode in rage. The incident also
reminded me that there is very little visible effort from DMRC when it comes to
enforcement of rules and regulations. Never once in the past ten years
have I seen anybody getting fined for breaking the rules.
In
countries like Japan, eating and drinking is permitted on the metro trains. These
are societies that value virtues of tidiness, self-control, and care for the
others, a value system is hardwired into children from a very early age. As
children turn into adults, it is not surprising to see that they need very
little external enforcement of rules. A stage is reached when people not
only regulate themselves but also take on the onus of gently reminding others
to do so.
It
is time we become more intolerant about the litter and garbage outside our own homes.
In the City of Djinns, there is a new monster sitting in the middle of one of its oldest streets. Arms outstretched into the sky, this yellow giant towers over the buses, trees and buildings, like a punk teenager waving out to the minarets of Old Delhi.
Step closer and you would see that it is a huge crane mounted on an oversized truck. "Liebherr" says the modest logo one one side, and the name of the construction company telescopes into the skies.
What does this machine do?
According to the locals, it has been brought in to pull out the Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) which has been burrowing under the streets. The DMRC website says that the Daryaganj-Delhi Gate line has the largest TBM assembled so far.
Where can I get some reliable information on these Liebherr's? How much weight can they carry? Why do they need to have those huge arms?
Another corruption scandal has come to light. Once again it is a foreign court that informs us that bribes were paid to Indian officials for a project in India.
This time, unfortunately, it is Delhi Metro that stands on the dock. According to UK's Serious Frauds Office, Alstom-France paid Rs 52 crore over six years to win transport contracts in India, Poland and Tunisia. Between the period 2001-2006, Alstom had won a Rs 255-crore signalling contract for the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC).
Details of this scam have been trickling down slowly over the past couple of months. Yesterday, we finally got a rebuttal from DMRC. The venerable Dr. Sreedharan stated unequivocally that the "Bribery story hold no water". His point was that in his time, DMRC had sufficient checks and balances in place. "If at all bribe has been paid" Dr. Sreedharan pointed out, "It must have been to individuals outside DMRC with a view to siphon back the amount to individuals of Alstom Network, UK".
So who got the moolah?
Outside DMRC, there were two other key players involved - a consulting firm called Pacific Consultants International (PCI) and JBIC (now JICA). It is interesting to note that around the same period (200-2006), PCI has been indulging in activities that did little to enhance company credibility.
Consider the following -
* Viet Nam, 2003: In 2008, Huynh Ngoc Si, former deputy director of the Ho Chi Minh City’s transport department and head of a major Japanese ODA-backed highway project, was convicted of taking bribes in 2003 by receiving $262,000 from executives of Pacific Consultants International, which was hired as the project consultant. * India, 2004: PCI lost a case to the Joint Commisioner of Income Tax who held it liable deduct tax to the tune of Rs. 3,26,99,128 for various financial years involved. PCI had been claiming tax-exemption for its expat employees in India without any legal basis. * Japan, 2008: PCI was fined JPY 70 million (approximately USD 680,000) by the Tokyo District Court, and three former PCI executives were given suspended sentences of imprisonment for 18 months, 20 months, and 2 years, respectively, for paying bribes to Vietnamese government officials in order to obtain consulting contracts for a highway project also funded by ODA and distributed by JICA.
India is now sending its officials to SFO-UK to collect details on the kickbacks.
For the sake of Delhi Metro, let us hope that DMRC officials come out squeaky clean!
* (ToI, ) -- Bribery Story Hold No Water -- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Bribery-story-holds-no-water-Sreedharan/articleshow/44635674.cms
* Soni, Anusha (BS-11Sep) - Bribe charges link Alstom to firms from Singapore, Hong Kong -- http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/bribe-charges-link-alstom-to-firms-from-singapore-hong-kong-114091100996_1.html
- Indo European Ventures Pte Ltd, Singapore and Global King Technology Ltd, Hong Kong
Garbage Bins, Janpath: Right in the middle of the most touristy street market in Delhi, these two garbage-bins have been placed upside down for the past four years. Why? - because Delhi Police is afraid that some terrorist might place bombs in them. If so, what can be reason for not removing them permanently?
Open drain bordering Harola, Sector 5, Noida: The plastic bags are floating atop noxious drain-water, and yet, the entire stretch is a blind spot. Food-carts and restaurants continue to cook and sell their stuff nonchalantly, all along this stretch, amidst swarms of flies...and nobody seems to care. Why?
Un-Fare: Autos with UP number plates are harassed and bribed by policemen in Delhi and the compliment is returned by their counterparts in Uttar Pradesh. The drivers have the convenient choice of making monthly bribe payments (~ Rs. 1500), at any five designated point. Since they are not obliged to go by the meter in any case, the cost is passed on to the passengers. Nobody complains - why?
In Delhi Metro, why are many cars marked with the number "6"?
Also, why are two painted "bulls-eyes" kept dangling from the roof of Laxmi Nagar station?
Do eavesdropping tigers also get dunked in Yamuna after the puja-season? ;)
.
This post is an attempt to collect & respond to feedback received on my OpEd article (Business Line 30 Sep., 2011), titled - "Where Delhi Metro Went Off-Track".
First of all, the caveats:
I am just a curious fellow and not the 'ultimate authority on urban rail transport technology'.
I am from IRMA and my main area of interest is Development - especially the use of technology for, and by the 'bottom billion';
The article is an extract from my Master's thesis at University of Tsukuba, Japan (2009-2011), titled, "International Technology Transfers and the Role of Governments: A Study on Japanese Official Development Assistance for the Railway Sector in India". This document and can be accessed at the university library, and perhaps at the World Bank Library (the sabbatical was on a WB-GSP scholarship).
Nothing could be further from the truth. Dr. Sreedharan is one of the few people I admire in Indian public life, for what he has accomplished despite being swamped in a sea of mediocrity and cynicism. He is the unassuming nature-lover I often ran into at the Jahanpanah City Forest in Delhi, and a man, who, in Kipling's words, truly 'walks with kings without losing the common touch'.
In the comparison between the Delhi Metro and the Bullet-Train (Shinkansen) project, I had described the stellar role of Shinji Sogo, the president of JNR. Sogo's right-hand man was Hideo Shima, a brilliant Chief Engineer and Manager who was actually responsible for implementing the project. Dr. Sreedharan's role can be compared to that of Shima. What he lacked in the Indian context was the backing of an experienced statesman like Sogo, who looked beyond project deadlines, with a clear vision of long-term National Interest. "Indigenous manufacturing of such complex infrastructure needs for railways, airlines etc is still at least 20 - 25 years away in India" "The simple fact is Indian engineering is just not ready to offer world class products without significant external help."-- Venkat
Maybe it is 20-25 years away-- if we make a start now. The point I am trying to make is that unless we encourage the domestic manufacturing industry, we will get stuck with expensive imports. Have you noticed how, after buying a nifty printer at a bargain price, you are forced to pay through your nose for the cartridge refills? A metro may be no different.
"For DMRC the target was not the promotion of indigenous technology but providing masses friendly mass transit system....Sheer number of engineers and their talent does not deliver on R&D...R&D may be or should be the next level of evolution for DMRC once phase III is functional." - Diwaker Srivastava
I agree with the first two points but not the last one. R&D cannot start as an afterthought - it has to be based on a continuous learning strategy, right from the very beginning. I am not sure if RDSO or DMRC has such an institutional mechanism in place.
"The amount of Rs.1016 crore is a minuscule amount if you see the operational efficiencies and quality of coaches being used in DMRCL" - Vijay Nair
The current operating profit of DMRC is less than Rs. 350 Cr. Would you still say that the forex expenditure on contracts & consultancy fees (Rs. 1,1316 Cr. 2009-10), is a "minuscule amount"?
Will Delhi Metro Turn into a White Elephant? (Business Standard, 12 Oct 2010) - http://business.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/oct/12/slide-show-1-will-delhi-metro-turn-into-a-white-elephant.htm?print=true
We need to take a leaf out of the Japanese experience in achieving technological self-sufficiency.
Delhi Metro preferred to put its faith in foreign consultants, unlike Japan which encouraged its own rail companies.
29 September, 2011
It is now almost a decade since the Delhi Metro
commenced its operations in the National Capital Region. A project
substantially financed by Japanese soft-loans has grown with time to
become a ‘lifeline' for the people of Delhi. Yet, the entire network
continues to be heavily reliant on imported equipment and spares.
While
there cannot be too many doubts regarding the utility and efficiency of
Delhi Metro's services, or even the project execution standards laid by
it, the question is: Have we been effective in leveraging this project
to create a vibrant domestic manufacturing industry in urban railways?
Has it facilitated domestic Research and Development (R&D) and
innovations to suit the diverse working conditions across India?
From Delhi Metro Rail Corporation's (DMRC) own annual reports, progress
in this field has been peripheral, at best. Manufacturing is limited to
coach shells and bogies being built by Bombardier-India and Bharat
Earth Movers Limited (BEML).
Under the head
‘Technology Absorption', the 2009-10 report mentions fire retardant
low-smoke zero-halogen, low-voltage cables, fire pumps and 25kV rigid
overhead electrical systems and “other items which were imported in
Phase-I (and) have since been developed by Indian industries and
supplied in Phase-II”. But the core technologies — electrical traction
systems, rolling stock and signalling — remain firmly under the control
of foreign companies.
All this is reflected in the
huge forex outflows towards expenditure for contracts and consultancy
fees (Rs 1,316 crore in 2009-10). The strategic and financial
implications of this kind of dependency cannot be ignored.
LEARNING FROM JAPAN
In
this context, perhaps we might take a leaf out of the Japanese
experience in achieving technological self-sufficiency. Take Japan's
famous ‘Bullet Trains' (Shinkansen), which actually emerged from a World
Bank-aided programme in the 1960s. For that time, the Shinkansen
concept, which was not just new but also revolutionary, introduced
innovations that are standard features for all high-speed rail networks.
These
innovations came when Japan was still under a US-led occupation through
General Douglas MacArthur's Supreme Command of the Allied Powers
(SCAP). In the late 1950s, a team of visionary leaders emerged in Japan
National Railways (JNR). Foremost among them was Shinji Sogo, a former
director of the South Manchuria Railways (Mantetsu), which had, for more
than half a century, been funnelling out raw materials from China for
imperial Japan's war efforts.
Following Japan's
surrender in 1945, the SCAP imposed measures to ensure effective
de-militarisation of the country. The aeronautics industry, responsible
for creating legendary fighting machines like such as the ‘Zeros'
(Mitsubishi fighter planes), was dismantled. Rendered jobless, a large
number of aeronautical engineers and designers moved into the railway
sector. Next to the military, the railways now had the largest number of
engineers.
By the early 1950s, the main Tokaido
line, connecting Tokyo to Osaka, was getting congested. Although it
represented only three per cent of the railway system by length, it
carried 24 per cent of JNR's traffic and 23 per cent of its freight. The
highways, too, were congested, while the existing narrow gauge railway
was already operating at full capacity.
REASONS FOR SUCCESS
The
stage was then set for building the Shinkansen. Under Sogo's
leadership, JNR and the Railway Technical Research Institute (RTRI)
prepared a feasibility study. The government was persuaded to fund the
project through a WB loan. When ‘experts' from the Bank recorded their
reservations on the ambitious project, Sogo stood firmly by his own
engineers' side and reiterated his confidence in the technical
capabilities of RTRI.
The Bank ultimately agreed to
furnish a loan of $80 million, which was more than a quarter of the
project cost.When it was finally unveiled in 1964 — well in time for the
Tokyo Olympics — the new railway system symbolised the coming-of-age of
Japan's technical prowess and self-reliance. The project's success also
boosted the confidence of RTRI as an institution and it went on to be a
global leader in rail innovation & technology. Three technology
elements were critical to the success of the Shinkansen project, all of
which came from RTRI: Dedicated high-quality tracks, minimal curves
along the route, and the special rolling stock. The tracks were composed
of long-welded rails, each measuring approximately a mile in length,
and linked together by expansion joints, with double elastic fastenings
on pre-stressed concrete ties. The track curves were designed to be
gentle, permitting the maintenance of higher speeds.
Unlike
conventional railways, the Shinkansen did not have dedicated engines —
they relied on ‘distributed power' with motors and axles all along the
train, rather than having them concentrated at either end. This reduced
track wear and tear, improved braking and reliability.
RTRI-JNR
also conducted extensive research to create light-weight bogies. Bodies
were made of aluminium rather than steel; special welding techniques
were used to dispense with heavy fillers in the body shell; and the
axles strengthened by metallurgical elements to avoid the need for extra
weight. Several prototypes were designed and tested for coming up with
the best possible equipment for the local running conditions, which, of
course, included measures against earthquakes and high-speed winds. It
is worth noting that none of the R&D and testing involved any of the
leading Western railroad companies.
FOREIGN CONSULTANTS
In
India, the equivalent of Japan's RTRI is the Railway Design and
Standards Organisation (RDSO). However, as the title suggests, its
emphasis has been more on testing and approval of standards than in any
breakthrough innovations. RDSO's limited role in urban transport systems
is apparent from the fact that the chaotic construction of Kolkata
Metro in the 1970s yielded few lessons. More than two decades later,
Delhi Metro preferred to start on a clean slate, putting its faith in
foreign consultants rather than RDSO or building local institutional
capabilities.
Unlike India, Japan, from the very
outset, encouraged its own rail companies. The Shinkansen project
involved five of them — Nippon Sharyo, Hitachi, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Kiki Sharyo and Tokyu Car Corp. A healthy competition within
the private sector ensured that innovative ideas emerging from the
national labs were quickly adopted, leading to a continuous improvement
of Japan's railway infrastructure.
The absence of
close collaboration between public R&D and the private sector has
been India's Achilles Heel. Unless local manufacturers are encouraged to
participate and compete in the railway sector, our dependence on
foreign equipment suppliers, their expensive spares and consultancy
services will only grow.
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Update - 30Mar15 - ToI - Make in India: Most Metro trains are desi -- http://www.pressreader.com/india/the-times-of-india-new-delhi-edition/20150330/281586649099066/TextView
