Aadhaar - Biometric Mismatch

Last week I found myself in a bit of a fix while trying to book a ride back home late at night.
Standing on a lonely roadside waiting for a confirmation on my Uber ride, I found that I no money to pay for it - there was no cash in my pocket, and my e-wallet account balance was below the minimum INR 350.

My account with Uber is linked to PayTM, a popular e-wallet platform in India. Uber gave me two options for topping up - through my credit-card or directly through PayTM. The latter had been an easier process but this hit a wall with the message which said that my account was not yet KYC compliant.

Know Your Customer (KYC) is now compulsary for all e-wallet accounts as per the new rules set by the central bank. Introduced with the objective of reducing misuse and money-laundering, KYC requires submission of id proof -  details of Passport, Tax PAN or the Adhaar universial id number.  I was under the impression that Adhaar was the fastest way of fulfilling KYC norms. I had done it earlier for my bank accounts and for a JIO mobile connection. It had taken just a few minutes to get an online confirmation.

However, the process was quite different for the PayTM. As soon as I sent my 16-digit number, I got a message saying that a PayTM representative come an meet me personally for a confirmation. A confirmation? Why is additional confirmation needed when, according to UIDAI's own procedures, the number could be used to confirm my identity with their central database? Anyway, since there was no hope of completing the KYC standing by the roadside at night, I went back to Uber and transferred some money to my PayTM account using my credit card.

A few days later, and after a series of SMSs, a representative of PayTM's "partner" turned up at my door with portable fingerprint scanner plugged into his mobile phone. He passed me his mobile and told me to type in my Adhaar number. Soon I got a message on my mobile with a code and a URL with the message - "By providing this code to our agent, you agree to become a full KYC customer of PayTM Payments Bank and confirm acceptance." You have no time to check the fine-print so the agent gets his code.

After this, a mouse-like device is used to scan my thumb-prints. One by one, the scanner moves from my thumb, to the pointer and index, until all 10 fingerprints are covered. For each and every scan he gets a message (from where? UIDAI?) saying that all the authentications had failed!

The look of amazement on my face prompted the agent to console me - "Aise hota reha hai...fingerprint badal jaate hei" (This keeps happening, fingerprints change over time). WTF?? I had heard about farm workers losing their fingerprints to hard labour but my fingers were anything but callused, or even unclean!

How can UIDAI authentications fail in urban areas? A quick internet search reveals that mine is not an isolated case. While authentication failures have been quite common on rural areas - due to incorrectly captured fingerprints, poor internet connectivity or a change in biometric details because of old age or wear and tear - it is now increasingly common in urban areas as well.

The Adhaar UID is no doubt backed by the laws of probablity and complex algorithms but this experience has placed me firmly in the ranks of the Adhaar skeptics. Failing to get an Uber taxi ride due to an Adhaar biometric failure hardly makes a difference to me, but to think that millions depends on this flawed system for their rations is just unexcusable.


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Other Unanswered Questions:

* Now that the private sub-contractor to PayTM has all my fingerprints scanned and saved, what are the chances of misuse?


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REFERENCES / LINKS

* https://www.businesstoday.in/current/policy/linking-aadhaar-with-paytm-deadline-ends-today-to-complete-kyc-for-e-wallets/story/271698.html
* Scroll on KYC problems - https://scroll.in/article/870873/indias-e-wallets-are-struggling-to-weather-the-storm-set-off-by-mandatory-aadhaar-linked-kyc-norms
* How to link PayTM with Adhaar - https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/how-to/how-to-link-paytm-with-aadhaar/article22866742.ece
* Fingerprint authentication failure - https://scroll.in/article/857274/now-even-the-fingerprints-of-urban-indians-are-failing-during-aadhaar-authentication
* Medianama rebuttal to N.Nilekani's claims - https://www.medianama.com/2017/04/223-nandan-nilekani-aadhaar/

Big Data, Small World

When a magazine like Foreign Policy comes up with an article titled 'The Rise of Big Data' you know that something has tumbled out of geekdom to the world of ordinary mortals.

The article talks about 'incredible new uses (of data) with the assistance of inexpensive computer memory, powerful processors, smart algorithms, clever software, and math that borrows from basic statistics'.  Instead of trying to “teach” a computer how to do things, the new approach is to feed enough data into a computer so that it can infer the possible answers on its own. 

India's ambitious UID project does not find mention here - perhaps its not big enough - but it does describe some amazing new uses of data. One of these is Prof. Shigeomi Koshimizu's "bottom-up" approach to establishing unique identities.

Prof. Shigeomi's team at AIIT-Tokyo placed 360 pressure-sensors on car-seats and found that when a person is seated, the contours of the body, its posture, and its weight distribution can all be quantified and tabulated and converted to a digital code that is unique to each individual!

Perhaps the day is not far when Indian's lining up for their UID cards will be spared the trouble of scanning fingerprints and of staring into machines for iris patterns. They would just have to just sit on a chair while somebody verifies their application and simply walk out with a biometric-id card..  :-)

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LINKS & REFERENCES

Cukier, Kenneth Neil  and Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger (2013): The Rise of Big Data - How It's Changing the Way We Think About the World, Foreign Policy, May/June 2013 -- url -- http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139104/kenneth-neil-cukier-and-viktor-mayer-schoenberger/the-rise-of-big-data?page=show

Japanese boffins crack arse-based ID recognizer -- url -- http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/12/27/japanese_bum_id_recognizer/

The Burden of Biometrics

A few days ago, the Indian Prime Minister handed over the 210-million-th Unique Identification (UID aka Adhaar) card to Bali Devi of Purawar village in Rajasthan. He also promised that in two years' time, half of India will have such a card, and this, hopefully,  will enable each of them to have easier access government welfare schemes.

Most of the welfare schemes based on state subsidies to the "three Fs" (food-fuel-fertilizers), which now accounts for Rs. 2.16 trillion ($55 billion), or 2.5% of GDP. However, much of these subsidies 'leak' out of the system long before they reach the intendend benificiaries -- the poorest of poor in India, numbering about 400 million. The UID-Adhaar project aims to plug these leaks by directing cash-subsidies directly into registered bank accounts.

Results from pilot tests are quite mixed. In one town called Kotkasim the Fair Price Shops were selling their entire allotted stock of 84,000 litres of kerosene a month before the project started. They is now selling 22,000 litres — ample proof that subsidised kerosene was being diverted for other purposes, mainly to adulterate diesel. On the other hand, in Beelaheri, another village near Kotkasim, hundreds of bank accounts have been set up without referencing the UID database, as the government pushed ahead with the politically rewarding cash transfers before readying Aadhar to identify the correct beneficiaries.

This brings up the enormous complexities in the technical and administrative challanges of a project of this magnitude. Each individual record (iris-scans, fingerprints & face-scans) takes up about 5MB of space. Multiply that with 210 million and you already have UID servers in Bangalore/Delhi handling a million GB of data. In two years' this is expected to grow to 3 million GB, and, whenever the project is completed, it would hold a least 6 million GBs for 1.2 billion citizens of India.

Is there any other database of of this magnitude and complexity? With each additional 100 million enrollments, how does the system cross-check for duplications in a billion records within a few seconds?

Earlier this year, Mr. Nilakeni insisted that, "The UIDAI biometric system is processing over 100 trillion biometric person matches with a high degree of accuracy each day capable of issuing a million (10 Lakh) Aadhaars daily."

How do they achieve this? UIDAI does not venture to explain this in simple terms, except by stating that they would be using "mulit-modal ‘Fusion’ approach of biometrics" and that accuracy is maintained using "multi-ABIS  solution architecture".

This is where I lose the plot... :(

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* Unique identification Authority of India (UIDAI) Home Page - http://uidai.gov.in/

* Das, Krishna (2012): PDS GET SMART, Business Standard, 28Oct12, url - http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/pds-gets-smart/490869/

* http://uidai.gov.in/contracts-awarded-link.html

* http://www.whatsabyte.com/

* Mehta, Bhanu Pratap (2012): Laying a New Adhaar, Indian Express, 25Oct12, url - http://www.indianexpress.com/news/laying-a-new-aadhaar/1021583/

* Kumar, Manoj (2012): India Risks Backlash Hurrying Through Adhaar Project, Reuters, 25Oct12, url - http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/10/25/india-welfare-uid-aadhaar-system-idINDEE89O04Y20121025
- In 2010, a McKinsey report estimated such an electronic platform for government payments to households would save up to $18 billion annually - enough to wipe out one-sixth of a fiscal deficit that could hit 6 percent of GDP this fiscal year.
- The government is likely to spend over $55 billion this fiscal year ending in March on fuel, fertiliser and food subsidies, as well as a flagship scheme guaranteeing 100 days of work a year to rural labourers, and other welfare programmes.

* Half India will own Adhaar Card by 2014: PM Singh (NI Wire) - http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/10/20/281-Half-India-will-own-Adhaar-Card-by-2014-PM-Singh.html

* Singh, Sushant (2012): PDS reform using Aadhaar, the Kotkasim way, Mid-Day, 10 April 2012, url - http://www.mid-day.com/columnists/2012/apr/100412-opinion-PDS-reform-using-Aadhaar-the-Kotkasim-way.htm
- At Kotkasim (Alwar, Rajasthan)20,000 ration card holders, who had to open zero-balance, no-frills bank accounts for getting the subsidy. Initial public resistance was overcome by the district administration by transferring three months of subsidy in advance to the bank accounts. Results of the project have shown that substantial economies in subsidy outgo can be achieved by use of Aadhaar platform. Kotkasim, which was was selling its entire allotted stock of 84,000 litres of kerosene a month before the project started, is now selling 22,000 litres — ample proof that subsidised kerosene was being diverted for other purposes, mainly to adulterate diesel.

* Malik, Aman (2012): Subsidy Bill Reduction Target 'Ambitious', WSJ-Mint, url - http://www.livemint.com/Politics/LAOMZ15cTJuuJ0wZDBQzRP/Subsidy-bill-reduction-target-8216ambitious8217.html

* UID and the PDS System - http://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/uid_and_pds.pdf

* http://uidai.gov.in/contracts-awarded-link.html

* http://www.whatsabyte.com/

* UIDAI - Biometrics Soultion Provider Experience - http://www.biometrics.org/bc2012/presentations/UIDAI/UID%20BSP%20update%20Kris%20ver%202%201040.pdf